The example sentence is ambiguous. The problem is that the word "that" works both ways: It not only restricts "causes friction" to having a subject of "[any] contact", it also restricts the "contact" to having the attribute of "causes friction". Either way, the existence of the hypothetical "contact" is negated by the word "no".
It could mean exactly what the original poster intends: There is no contact between the objects, so there is no friction between the objects. In this case, the emphasis is on restricting "causes friction".
However, the example sentence does not rule out the possibility that the might be some contact between the objects, but (somehow) the contact does not cause friction between the objects. In this case, the emphasis is on restricting the kinds of "contact" being discussed. For example, the objects could contact each other in a place where there is no relative motion between the objects. Or the coefficient of friction between the objects could be very low, or there could be very little force pressing the objects together. These effects could cause the friction force between the objects to be negligible compared to other forces affecting the objects.
The "No true Scotsman" logical fallacy plays with words in a similar way.